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Appeal No. 930280-CA
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Defendants/Respondents.

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the order of
the Industrial Commission pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §35-1-86.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The Petitioner has only presented three issues for review.
First, did the Industrial Commission apply the appropriate
standard of review of the administrative law judges decisions. This
is an issue of law and is reviewed under a correction of error
standard.

Morton Intl., Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581

(Utah, 1991)
Second, was the decision of the Commission supported by the
facts.

This is a factual determination which is reviewed under a

substantial evidence standard. Ashcroft vs. Industrial Commissionr
885 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993)

1

Third, was Petitioner

denied

due process by either the

administrative law judges delay in rendering a decision or the
review afforded by the Industrial Commission.

This is a question

of law and reviewed under a correction of error standard.

Morton

Intl.r Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah, 1991)
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following are determinative statues which are set out in
their entirety in the addendum to this brief.
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-16(g)
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-8
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-10
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-12
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an Appeal from an Order of the Utah Industrial
Commission.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On December 31, 1991 Petitioner filed an Application for
Hearing with the Industrial Commission of Utah requesting medical
expenses, permanent, partial and temporary partial disability
compensation, interest, travel expenses and permanent and total
disability. A hearing was held before an administrative law judge
on June 12, 1992. The petitioner was present and represented by an
attorney.

The employer was present through its insurer and

represented by an attorney and the Employers Reinsurance Fund was
represented by its administrator and attorney.
2

After the hearing

the

Administrative

Law

Judge

entered

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law and an Order which were dated November 20, 1992.
This Order denied petitioner's application and found that there was
no compensable

industrial

accident.

Petitioner, through her

attorney, filed a timely Motion for Review of the Administrative
Law Judge's order with the Utah Industrial Commission. On the 2nd
day of April, 1993 The Utah Industrial Commission issued its Order
Denying Motion for Review.

Petitioner subsequently filed her

Notice of Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals.
The Utah Court of Appeals on Motion of Petitioner
stipulation

of the parties remanded

the matter back

and

to the

Industrial Commission on the 28th day of October, 1993 for the
limited purpose of determining whether the Petitioner had shown by
a preponderance of evidence that she was entitled to compensation.
The Industrial Commission entered its Order on Remand finding that
petitioner had not shown she had suffered an industrial accident by
a preponderance of the evidence and once again sustained the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law
Judge.
DISPOSITION AT AGENCY
The Industrial Commission of Utah has upheld the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law of its Administrative Law Judge which
found

that

no

compensable

industrial

petitioner.

3

accident

occurred

to

RELEVANT FACTS
The following are the facts relevant to this case with
appropriate citations to the record:
1.

Petitioner was an employee of the Tooele Valley Regional

Medical Center.(Transcript pg. 8)
2.

Petitioner had a history of problems with her right

shoulder and right arm extending back at least three years prior to
July 15, 1991. (Transcript pgs. 24-26, 47-51)
3.

Petitioner had been receiving medical treatment for her

shoulder prior to July 15, 1991. (Transcript pgs. 24-26, 47-51)
4. Petitioner suffered an industrial injury to her lower back
in April, 1991. (Transcript pg. 51)
5. Petitioner applied to her employer's insurance company for
medical benefits for an operation to her shoulder under her claim
from her industrial accident of April, 1991. (Transcript pg. 51 &
105)
6.

The insurance company denied coverage to her for the

shoulder since the claim was for an injury to her back. (Transcript
pg. 106)
7. After denial of the benefits, petitioner reported that she
had suffered a second industrial accident on July 15, 1991 which
injured her shoulder. (Transcript pg. 105)
8. Petitioner had left work July 15, 1991 complaining of pain
in her shoulder. (Transcript pg. 21)
9. Petitioner did not report to her supervisor when leaving
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work on July 15th that she had suffered an industrial accident.
(Transcript pgs. 123, 124-131)
10. Petitioner did not report the alleged industrial accident
of July 15, 1991 until after the medical procedure on her shoulder
had

been

denied

under

her

April, 1991

industrial

accident.

(Transcript pgs. 115-120)
11.

Petitioner was released by her doctors to return to work

on November 4, 1991, but chose to retire on November 10, 1991.
(Transcript pgs. 135-136, 139)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission has applied the appropriate standard
of review. Although there is some confusion in the Industrial
Commission's first Order Denying Motion for Review, the Industrial
Commission now has clearly applied the appropriate standard and has
found that petitioner did not prove that she had a compensable
injury by a preponderance of the evidence.
Petitioner was not denied due process of law by the delay in
receiving a decision from the Administrative Law Judge since she
suffered no prejudice as a result of the delay.
The decision of the Industrial Commission of Utah and the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law
Judge should be upheld by this Court. The Administrative Law Judge
found that the petitioner, Jennie Featherstone, had failed to show
by a preponderance of credible evidence that an industrial accident
occurred on July 15, 1991, and therefore, she was not entitled to
Workers Compensation benefits.

The Findings of Fact that lead to
5

this conclusion are all supported by evidence contained within the
record. The evidence which the Administrative Law Judge discounted
was based upon the credibility of the witnesses.

Issues of

credibility should be left to the trier of fact to determine.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Industrial Commission did apply the proper
standard of review of the Administrative Law
Judge's decision.
Petitioner

has argued

in her

Brief

that the

Industrial

Commission misapplied the standard of review in looking at the
Administrative Law Judge's decision.

She relies on the case of

Ashcroft vs. Industrial Commission, 885 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993).
In Ashcroft the Court of Appeals held that there is a distinction
between the standard preponderance of evidence and substantial
evidence, and that this difference is significant.
explained

The Court

that a reviewing body, such as this Court, applies the

standard of substantial evidence to examine whether the record
contains evidence supporting the findings made by the trier of
fact.

The reviewing court does not weigh the evidence.

In

contrast, a trier of fact, including the Commission, determines
whether the Petitioner has met his or her burden, the standard
being preponderance of the evidence.
While

some confusion

existed

Ashcroft at page 269.
as to whether

or not the

Industrial Commission misapplied these standards of review, this
Matter was remanded back to the Industrial Commission to resolve
this alleged error. The Order on Remand clearly applies the
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appropriate standard.

The Industrial Commission found:

For the reasons outlined above, we find that the
Applicant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that she injured her right shoulder in a
compensable industrial accident on July 15, 1991.
The Industrial Commission has now specifically applied the
appropriate standard of review to the Administrative Law Judge's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Petitioner's argument now
is clearly without merit.
POINT II
The decision of the Industrial Commission
of Utah and its Administrative Law Judge
should be sustained by the Court when the
issue turns on credibility of evidence and
witnesses.
Findings of Fact of the Utah Industrial Commission should be
upheld by this Court unless the determination of fact is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the Court. (See Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-16(4)(g))

In

this matter the Utah Industrial Commission in adopting the Findings
of the Administrative Law Judge has determined that Petitioner's
shoulder was not injured in an industrial accident on July 15,
1991. Petitioner is now challenging these Findings in the Court of
Appeals.
necessary

In order to successfully challenge these Findings, it is
that

the

Petitioner

marshall

all

of

the

evidence

supporting the Findings and show that despite the facts in support
of the Findings and in light of the conflicting or contradictory
evidence the Findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
Merriam vs. Board of Review, 812 P. 2d 447, (Utah App. 1991). Since
7

Petitioner's Brief does not marshall all of the evidence in support
of the Industrial Commission's finding that no industrial accident
occurred and then make a showing from the record that the factual
determination was unsupported this Court should accept the findings
of the Industrial Commission.
Respondent

admits that there

is evidence

in the record

contradictory to the evidence that no industrial accident occurred,
but the trier of fact determined that this evidence either did not
support the contentions of Petitioner or lacked credibility. There
is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Industrial
Commission of Utah.

These facts supported by citations to the

record are contained in this brief's Statement of Facts and can be
summarized as follows:
her

right

shoulder

Petitioner had a history of problems with
which

predated

the

alleged

injury

by

approximately three years; Petitioner had expressed to her doctor
symptoms similar to what she alleged to have been caused by the
industrial accident prior to the industrial accident;

Petitioner

did not report the industrial accident at the time the accident was
alleged to have occurred; Petitioner attempted to get the shoulder
covered under a prior industrial accident claim; and Petitioner
only reported the industrial accident after the insurance carrier
for the employer had denied coverage for the requested treatment
under the prior industrial accident claim. This evidence supports
the conclusion of the Industrial Commission that no compensable
industrial accident occurred and is substantial enough to meet the
standard required by Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-16(4)(g).
8

The Industrial Commission's determination on credibility should
be deferred to by this Court.

As stated in Grace Drilling, v.

Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989):
It is the province of the Board, not appellate courts, to
resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent
inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for
the Board to draw the inferences.(citations omitted)
Grace id. at 68.
Since
support

Petitioner

the

has

Boards's

not marshalled

conclusion

and

all

the

which

facts

which

contradict

her

conclusions and has not shown the factual determination that no
compensable

industrial

accident

occurred

to

Petitioner was an

arbitrary and unreasonable conclusion by the Industrial Commission,
this Court should defer to the Industrial Commission's finding of
no industrial accident.
POINT III
Petitioner has not been denied due process
rights by the actions of the Industrial
Commission.
In her Statement of the Issues Petitioner avers that she is
presenting for review, issues concerning whether Petitioner's due
process rights have been denied by virtue of the Commission taking
too

long

in

making

its

Findings

of

Fact

and

whether

the

Petitioner's due process rights have been denied by virtue of the
Commission's

Findings of Fact being

arbitrary, capricious

and

wholly without cause. These issues are wholly without merit.
What is procedurally required by Industrial Commission has
been

established

by

the

State

Legislature

in

the

Utah

Administrative Procedures Act. (Utah Code Annotated §§63-46b-8, 6346b-10, 63-46b-12.)

The Industrial Commission has complied with
9

procedural

standards

in

processing

Petitioner's

application.

Petitioner apparently is challenging the Administrative Law Judge's
findings of fact and is questioning the Industrial Commissions
order on review.

Both of these meet the standards required by the

statutes referred to above, and while Utah Code Annotated §§ 6346b-10 requires that a decision be rendered in a reasonable time no
specific time table is mandated.
cases

which

would

specially

Petitioner has not cited any

define

what

is reasonable

for

a

Administrative Law Judge under circumstances similar to this matter
and this Respondent has not found any cases on point.

Petitioner

has not alleged any substantive harm or prejudice to her because of
the

delay

in

making

the

decision.

Since

no

prejudice

to

Petitioner's case has been shown by the delay between the hearing
and

the

rendering

of

the

decision, Petitioner's

assertion

of

violation of due process rights should be ignored as a harmless
error at most.

An error is harmless if it is:

Sufficiently inconsequential...that there is
no reasonable likelihood that the error
affected the outcome of the proceeding. Morton
Intl., Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581
(Utah, 1991) at pg. 84.
Even if the delay in the decision was longer than reasonable,
there is no showing that it affected the outcome of this claim.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Industrial Commission should be upheld.
The

appropriate

standard

of

review

of

the Administrative

Law

Judge's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law was employed by
the Industrial Commission.

The dispute between Petitioner and the
10

Industrial Commission's decision hinges on an interpretation of
evidence, and the credibility of witnesses.

The Findings of Fact

of the Industrial Commission are supported by substantial evidence
in

the

record.

The

Court

should

therefore

defer

to this

determination of fact and uphold the decision denying benefits to
the Petitioner.
DATED this 3%

day of January, 1994.

i

i~.

DAVID L. CHURCH
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
Utah Local Government Trust
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ADDENDUM
ORDER

DENYING

A

MOTION

FOR

REVIEW

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Jennie M. Featherstone,

*
*

Applicant,
vs.

*
*
*

Tooele Valley Regional and/or
*
Utah Local Government Trust and *
Employers' Reinsurance Fund,
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW
Case No. 92000079

*

Respondents.

*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah issues this order pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-78 and Section 63-46b-12.
The applicant timely filed this motion for review of the
administrative law judge's ("ALJ") order dated November 20, 1992•
Said order denied the applicant's claim for workers' compensation
benefits pursuant to an alleged July 15, 1991 industrial accident.
The applicant asserts that the ALJ improperly based his
decision on credibility when the testimony of the applicant and her
witnesses was not contradicted by other witnesses or other evidence
in the record. She further asserts that the ALJ's findings of fact
are clearly erroneous and are not supported by the evidence in the
record.
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), an
ALJ's findings of fact will be sustained if the findings are
supported by "substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court." U.C.A. 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1992).
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence
... though "something less than the weight of the evidence." Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Ut. App. 1989)
quoting Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
In its
discussion of review of agency factfinding, the court noted that it
would "not substitute its judgment as between two reasonable
conflicting views," even if the court may have reached a different
conclusion had the matter come before them on de novo review.
Grace Drilling at 68.
We will apply the substantial evidence test to the ALJ's
findings of fact, recognizing that the ALJ was present at the
hearing and was better able to observe the testimony and demeanor
of the witnesses and to evaluate their credibility than the
commission on its review of the record. We have reviewed the tape
of the hearing in order to better assess the conformity of the
ALJ's findings with the taped testimony.
Review of the medical records exhibit shows that the applicant
had a history of shoulder pain prior to July 15, 1991, the date of
the alleged industrial accident. Medical Records Exhibit, pp.

Jennie Featherstone
Order
Page two
00027, 00033, 00045, 00053, 00056, 00058, 00101, 00118, 00119,
00122.
Dr. Mark Greene, however, opined that the applicant's
rotator cuff injury which has been attributed to the alleged July
15, 1991 industrial accident, was different from the applicant's
1987 shoulder pain and bursitis.
Medical Records Exhibit, p.
00001.
The progress notes of Dr. David E. Curtis, the applicant's
treating physician, make reference to the applicant's "recurrent"
right shoulder pain.
Medical Records Exhibit, p. 00027.
Dr.
Curtis offered no opinion regarding the causal connection between
the applicant's rotator cuff tear and her employment, although he
did note that the applicant believed that her injury was associated
with "more heavy work at her dishwashing job, especially taking
care of the trays which come from the jail."
Medical Records
Exhibit, p. 00033. It is important to note that the applicant's
medical records indicate that she suffered the pain, popping and
grinding in her shoulder that she attributes to the industrial
accident before the alleged accident occurred.
Medical Records
Exhibit, p. 00027.
At the hearing, the applicant testified that on July 15, 1991,
she picked up 12 serving trays to place them in the dishwasher and
felt extreme pain "like her arm was being pulled out of the
socket." She told Food Services Manager Greg Coburn that her arm
hurt and she needed to go see her doctor.
Later that day, the
applicant saw her treating physician, Dr. Curtis.
Dr. Curtis
diagnosed a rotator cuff tear, but did not tell the applicant that
the injury predated the July 15, 1991 incident. With regard to
seeing Dr. Green for a second opinion, the applicant testified that
he told her that the 1991 rotator cuff injury was different from
her preceding shoulder problems. Dr. Green gave the applicant no
recommended course of treatment that she could recall, but she
testified that she "told him what she needed to have done and he
did it." Hearing Tape # 1 at 1275.
In addition, the applicant testified that she talked to Greg
and her supervisor, Opal West, on July 15, 1991 after the alleged
industrial accident. On cross examination, the applicant stated
that she believed she had been treated for arthritis in her
shoulder with cortisone shots prior to the accident. She testified
that prior to July 15, 1991, she suffered from severe shoulder
pain, popping and grinding. However, she didn't remember telling
Dr. Curtis about the pain, grinding and popping during her June 20,
1991 visit to the doctor. See Medical Records Exhibit at 00027.
The applicant further testified that when she suffered an
industrial injury to her low back in April 1991, she filled out an
accident report and reported to the emergency room per hospital
policy. On July 15, 1991, however, she claimed that her shoulder

Jennie Featherstone
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"hurt too much" and she didn't think about filling out an accident
report or going to the emergency room. Instead, she left work
early at about 9:00 a.m. to see her treating physician, Dr. Curtis.
The applicant stated that she initially thought her shoulder pain
was caused by arthritis, but later after she discovered there were
torn ligaments, she decided the injury must have resulted from
lifting the trays at work.
Penny Manchester, one of the applicant's co-workers, testified
that the applicant asked her to work for her on July 15, 1991. The
applicant appeared to be in a great deal of pain and was crying
when she asked Ms. Manchester to work for her. Ms. Manchester also
testified that Opal West was working on July 15, 1991.
Charles Featherstone, the applicant's husband of three years,
testified that before the alleged accident of July 15, 1991, the
applicant kept the house clean and always had supper ready when he
came home. After the accident, the house wasn't clean and supper
was "soup and sandwiches." Mr. Featherstone stated that his wife
seemed to be in more pain after July 15, 1991 than she was before
that date. He did not go with his wife to her June and July 1991
appointments with Dr. Curtis, so he did not know what the doctor
told her.
Marilyn Beesley, an insurance adjuster for the Utah Local
Government Trust, testified that she was the adjuster for the
applicant's April 16, 1991 lower back industrial claim.
She
received a request for approval of shoulder surgery to be charged
to the April 16, 1991 claim. Payment for the surgery was denied by
letter dated August 6, 1991 because there was nothing in her file
on the April 16, 1991 accident to support payment for the shoulder
surgery. The applicant called Ms. Beesley on August 7, 1991 to
request that she reconsider the denial of benefits. During this
conversation, the applicant did not mention a second accident in
July 1991. Ms. Beesley talked to the respondent in early August to
find out how the shoulder injury related to the accident in April
1991. The employer representative, Beth Bowles, indicated that she
did not know why the applicant had surgery. An employer's first
report of injury for the alleged July 15, 1991 accident was
received by the carrier on August 30, 1991.
Greg Coburn, the Director of Materials Management and Food
Services for the respondent testified that the applicant did not
tell him on July 15, 1991 that she had an industrial accident but
told him that her shoulder and arm hurt and she needed to leave.
The applicant had not mentioned her shoulder pain to him prior to
July 15, 1991. Mr. Coburn testified that Opal West was not working
on July 15, 1991. He stated that Opal regularly had Mondays off,
and that July 15, 1991 was a Monday. He also checked the work
schedule which showed that Opal was off that day and that Diane

Jennie Featherstone
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Moore was the supervisor on July 15, 1991. Mr. Coburn saw the
applicant on August 29, 1991 when she came in to file an employer's
first report of injury. On cross examination, Mr. Coburn stated
that he did not fill out an incident report on July 15, 1991
because the applicant did not tell him the injury was industrially
related.
Diane Moore, the applicant's supervisor on July 15, 1991
testified that she wasn't at work when the alleged accident
occurred, but came to work at about 9:00 a.m. that day.
The
applicant came to her and told her that her shoulder and arm ached
and she needed to go to the doctor. Prior to the date of the
accident Ms. Moore and the applicant had discussed the applicant's
shoulder pain which was attributed to arthritis. Ms. Moore further
testified that she didn't fill out an incident report because the
applicant did not say that she had suffered an industrial accident.
On August 29, 1991, Gary Coburn called Ms. Moore and told her to
help the applicant fill out an incident report for the alleged July
15, 1991 industrial accident.
We find that there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ's findings on the credibility of witnesses and the
compensability of the alleged industrial accident of July 15, 1991.
The evidence in the record shows that the applicant complained of
shoulder and arm pain on July 15, 1991 and left work to seek
medical attention.
Testimony of Jennie Featherstone, Penny
Manchester, Greg Coburn, Diane Moore.
The symptoms that the
applicant attributes to the industrial accident were present before
the alleged accident of July 15, 1991. Medical Records Exhibit, p.
00027. The accident was not immediately reported as industrially
caused and was not reported to the employer as an industrial
accident until the claim for benefits based upon the applicant's
April 16, 1991 industrial accident was denied. Testimony of Jennie
Featherstone, Greg Coburn, Diane Moore. There were no witnesses to
the alleged accident and the accident was not reported to any of
the applicant's co-workers. Testimony of Jennie Featherstone, Greg
Coburn, Diane Moore, Penny Manchester. The applicant's treating
physician attributed her complaints to a recurrent condition for
which she had previously sought treatment on June 20, 1991.
Medical Records Exhibit, p. 00027. Therefore, the evidence in the
record does not support a finding that the applicant was injured in
a compensable industrial accident on July 15, 1991.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the Order of the administrative law judge
dated November 30, 1992 is hereby affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah

Jennie Featherstone
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Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date of this order, pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53 (2) , 35-1-86, 63-46b-16,
and Bonded Bicycle Couriers v. Dept. of Employment Security et al«,
201 Utah Adv. Rep. 79. (CA, 12/04/92). The requesting party shall
bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals
purposes.
(^ f\

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
CSlleen S. Colton
Commissioner
Certified t h i s ^ ^ day of £?

sfiz+^D (0

Patricia O. Ashtoy
Commission Secretary
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 92-079
JENNIE M. FEATHERSTONE,
Applicant,
vs.
TOOELE VALLEY REGIONAL and/or
UTAH LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRUST
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FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on June
12, 1992 at 1:00 o'clock p.m.
Said hearing
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

The Honorable Donald L. George, Administrative Law
Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant, Jennie Featherstone, was present and
represented by David Parker, Attorney at Law.
The defendant employer, Tooele Valley Regional, and
its insurer, Utah Local Government Trust were
represented by David L. Church, Attorney at Law.
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund was represented by
its Administrator, Erie V. Boorman, Attorney at
Law.

An Application for Hearing requesting medical expenses,
permanent partial and temporary partial disability compensation,
interest, travel expenses and reserving the issue of permanent and
total disability was filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah
on December 31, 1991, wherein the applicant, Jennie M.
Featherstone, alleges that she sustained an injury by accident
arising out of or in the course of her employment with the
defendant employer, Tooele Valley Regional, on July 15, 1991. That
Application was assigned case number 92-079, a copy was sent to the
defendant employer, an Answer thereto timely filed, and accordingly
the matter was scheduled for hearing before the Industrial
Commission of Utah on June 12, 1992.
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Beyond the benefits applied for, the defendants' position was
that no industrial accident had occurred, and in the alternative,
if an industrial accident were found, legal causation would have to
be overcome as well. Credibility was deemed to be a major issue.
The applicant testified that on the day of the alleged
industrial accident, July 15, 1991, she was working at her job as
a dishwasher for Tooele Valley Regional. She stated that she moved
12 trays (which are weighed at 1 pound 13 ounces each) and felt a
stabbing pain in her arm and shoulder.
Later when her supervisor, Greg came in, she was reportedly
crying, he asked what was wrong and she said she had to go to the
doctor.
Previous to this in April, 1991, the applicant had another
industrial accident where she picked up a tray of milk in a walk-in
freezer, hurt her low back, and reported that.
Dr. Curtis treated her for this July accident by telling her
to take a few days off. When she returned to work around the end
of October or the end of November, she asked for and was put on as
a "cold cook" but represented that she was not able to handle it
for more than 4 days because lifting above her head was necessary
and she couldn't do it. She stated that she could not .return to
dishwashing because it was too hard on her arm.
On July 30, 1991, she reports surgery for a rotator cuff
repair, but still complained of pain after that procedure.
The applicant specifically stated that on the date of the
industrial accident, in addition to talking to supervisor, Greg,
she had also talked to her direct supervisor, Opal, about the
incident, but no report was filled out.
On cross-examination, the applicant acknowledged shoulder
problems prior to 1987. She also at first did not recall an
appointment with Dr. Curtis for this condition on June 20, 1991,
then acknowledged that she did. As to her July 15, 1991, visit
with Dr. Curtis, the medical records do not show any notations
indicating an industrial accident.
The applicant acknowledged
filing out an industrial accident claim for the April, 1991,
incident, and stated that on July 15, 1991, no report was made out
because she was in too much pain.
The applicant admitted that her leg pain was what prevented
her from doing the "cold cook" job, not her shoulder.
The
applicant disagreed with Dr. Curtis7 notes after the surgery which
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indicated that she had full range of motion and good strength.
When she went to Dr. Greene for a second opinion, she stated that
he did not relate to her pain.
The applicant admitted knowing the reporting procedure,
because it had been explained to her and because she had done so on
the prior industrial accident.
In support of her application, the applicant called as a
second witness, Penny Manchester, who did not witness the
industrial accident, but said the applicant approached her on that
day, told the witness that her arm was hurting and asked Manchester
to work for her, to which she agreed. Manchester's testimony shed
no light, and appeared to be straining to support the applicant's
position.
The applicant presented her husband as her third and final
witness, who acknowledged that his wife had arthritis, and recited
a litany of worsened symptoms after the alleged industrial
accident. He was however, clearly biased, argumentative, exhibited
selective favorable recall, was angry with Dr. Curtis for allegedly
not turning in the industrial accident reporting paper work until
a month and a half after, thereby damaging the applicant's cause;
he also disagreed with Dr. Curtis of full range of motion.
The defendants presented as their first witness, insurance
adjuster, Marilyn Beesley, who had talked with the applicant on
August 7, 1991, when the applicant called Beesley about her denial
letter to Dr. Curtis on August 6th. In that conversation, the
applicant was requesting Beesley to reconsider her denial, and
stated that her shoulder was giving her the problem all along
[since the prior industrial accident]. There was no mention of
July 15th or this alleged second industrial accident. On crossexamination, Beesley stated that she investigated further, and no
report had been made to the employer by the applicant concerning
the July 15th incident.
The defendant's second witness was Greg Coburn, the director
of material management and food services who stated that he did
observe the applicant in tears and that she stated that she could
not work and left. No industrial accident was reported to him at
that time, and he was surprised when it was later turned in as an
industrial accident.
Coburn testified that contrary to the applicant's statement
that she had reported this injury to Opal West on July 15th, which
was a Monday, Opal West did not work on Mondays, and when he
checked specifically as to the July 15th time sheet, West was off.
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Defendant's third witness was Diane Moore, who was the
applicant's direct supervisor on the date of the alleged injury.
She testified that the applicant did approach her around 9:30 or
10:00 a.m., and stated that she had to leave to go to the doctor
because her shoulder and arm ached. The applicant did not say
anything about an industrial accident at that time, and had
previously complained of shoulder pain, and taken time off.
On cross-examination, it was brought up that the applicant had
complained to Moore several times of her arm hurting because of
arthritis, but on August 29th, the applicant reported it as an
industrial accident.
Testimony ended.
Having reviewed the file, the exhibits, and further having had
an opportunity to observe the candor and demeanor of the witnesses,
the Administrative is now prepared to make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The applicant had problems with her right arm and shoulder
long before the alleged industrial accident of July 15, 1991,
complained of it to the doctors, and received treatments which
included shots up to five years previous. The medical records on
page 101, dated May 22, 1991, indicate increasing shoulder pain.
That is followed on June 20, 1991, by the notation that the
applicant " . . . has complained of this over the past 3 years."
2.
The applicant knew the industrial accident reporting
system well, having done so previously on February 11, 1985, when
she cut her finger;
December 21, 1984, when she burned her
forearm; November 7, 1990, when she cut her finger on a pot, and
the last mentioned incident of April 16, 1991, where she allegedly
hurt her back.
Yet, when she claims to have an unwitnessed
industrial accident on July 15, 1991, by her own testimony, she did
not report to Greg. She did, however, claim that she reported it
to Opal, who was not even present on that day (to the detriment of
the applicant's credibility), further the applicant did not mention
an industrial accident in her visit to Dr. Curtis that same day,
nor did she follow through in reporting the matter at all until
August 29th or after, when she had been denied medical expenses.
3. The applicant was released to return to work on November
4, 1991, but chose to retire on 11/10/91, and admitted that her leg
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pain was what prevented her from doing the "cold cook" work, not
her shoulder. Further, on November 14, 1991, the applicant applied
for unemployment benefits, stating only that she had back and leg
pain, with no mention of her shoulder.
4.
The applicant admitted that she told supervisor Greg
Coburn that it was arthritis, and an x-ray report of July 18, 1991,
does show degenerative joint disease.
5. Considering all the foregoing, the Administrative Law
Judge finds that the applicant is not a credible witness.
6. As to the applicant's second witness, Penny Manchester,
factually she added nothing, but was obviously attempting to
support the applicant's cause, but not convincingly.
7.
The applicant's husband was an antagonistic,, biased
witness on the applicant's behalf, argumentative, attacking Dr.
Curtis on various grounds, and having bursts of sudden favorable
recall. His testimony is neither credible nor reliable.
8. The ALJ finds the defense witnesses to be more credible
than those of the applicant. Their testimony and the medical
records are clear that the applicant had previously existing
problems with her arm and shoulder, and when she left on the day of
the alleged industrial incident, she gave no indication whatsoever
that this was an industrial accident, and thereafter did not report
it as such for another 6 weeks.
9. There is no connection between the applicant's shoulder
problem and the alleged industrial accident of July 15, 1991, nor
with the applicant's prior industrial injury of April, 1991, nor
her low back problems.
10. The applicant was not involved in a compensable industrial
accident on July 15, 1991.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant, Jennie M. Featherstone, has failed to show by
a preponderance of credible evidence that an industrial accident
occurred on July 15, 1991, and accordingly she is not entitled to
workers compensation benefits.
Good cause appearing herein, the Administrative Law Judge
hereby issues the following:
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of the applicant,
Jennie M. Featherstone, for medical expenses, temporary total
disability, temporary partial disability, permanent partial
disability, interest, travel and permanent total disability
benefits as a result of a July 15, 1991, incident, should be and
the same is hereby denied and dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (3 0) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
(J

Donald L. George
Administrative Law Judge
Certified this ,j^c?jzD

day o f ^ K ^ i e .

ATTEST:
S

<& /Ar. ^<^

Patricia O. Ashb}
Commission Secretary,

* % % % « « * * •
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ORDER

ON

C

REMAND

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
P.O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
Jennie M. Featherstone,

*
*

Applicant,
vs.

*
*

Tooele Valley Regional and/or
*
Utah Local Government Trust and *
Employers'' Reinsurance Fund,
*
Respondents.

ORDER ON
REMAND
Case No. 92000079

*

*********************************

This matter was remanded to the Industrial Commission
("commission") by the Court of Appeals on October 28, 1993 for the
limited purpose of determining whether petitioner has shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to compensation.
The applicant filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits
based upon an alleged July 15, 1991 industrial accident.
An
administrative law judge of the commission ("ALJ") denied benefits
based in part on credibility determinations he made at the hearing.
We affirmed the ALJ's order based upon our determination that there
was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order.
The Court of
Appeals has held that we must apply the preponderance of the
evidence standard in our review of administrative law judge ("ALJ")
decisions.1
We will now review the evidence in the record to determine
whether the applicant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that she suffered a compensable industrial accident on July 15,
1993.
DISCUSSION:
Review of the medical records exhibit shows that the applicant
had a history of shoulder pain prior to July 15, 1991, the date of
the alleged industrial accident. Medical Records Exhibit, pp.
00027, 00033, 00045, 00053, 00056, 00058, 00101, 00118, 00119,
00122.
Dr. Mark Greene, however, opined that the applicant's
rotator cuff injury which has been attributed to the alleged July
15, 1991 industrial accident, was different from the applicant's
1987 shoulder pain and bursitis.
Medical Records Exhibit, p.
00001.
The progress notes of Dr. David E. Curtis, the applicant's
1

Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Ut.
App. 1993) .
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treating physician, make reference to the applicant's "recurrent"
right shoulder pain.
Medical Records Exhibit, p. 00027.
Dr.
Curtis offered no opinion regarding the causal connection between
the applicant's rotator cuff tear and her employment, although he
did note that the applicant believed that her injury was associated
with "more heavy work at her dishwashing job, especially taking
care of the trays which come from the jail."
Medical Records
Exhibit, p. 00033. It is important to note that the applicant's
medical records indicate that she suffered the pain, popping and
grinding in her shoulder that she attributes to the industrial
accident before the alleged accident occurred.
Medical Records
Exhibit, p. 00027.
At the hearing, the applicant testified that on July 15, 1991,
she picked up 12 serving trays to place them in the dishwasher and
felt extreme pain "like her arm was being pulled out of the
socket." She told Food Services Manager Greg Coburn that her arm
hurt and she needed to go see her doctor.
Later that day, the
applicant saw her treating physician, Dr. Curtis.
Dr. Curtis
diagnosed a rotator cuff tear, but did not tell the applicant that
the injury predated the July 15, 1991 incident. With regard to
seeing Dr. Green for a second opinion, the applicant testified that
he told her that the 1991 rotator cuff injury was different from
her preceding shoulder problems. Dr. Green gave the applicant no
recommended course of treatment that she could recall, but she
testified that she "told him what she needed to have done and he
did it." Hearing Tape # 1 at 1275.
In addition, the applicant testified that she talked to Greg
and her supervisor, Opal West, on July 15, 1991 after the alleged
industrial accident. On cross examination, the applicant stated
that she believed she had been treated for arthritis in her
shoulder with cortisone shots prior to the accident. She testified
that prior to July 15, 1991, she suffered from severe shoulder
pain, popping and grinding. However, she didn't remember telling
Dr. Curtis about the pain, grinding and popping during her June 20,
1991 visit to the doctor. See Medical Records Exhibit at 00027.
The applicant further testified that when she suffered an
industrial injury to her low back in April 1991, she filled out an
accident report and reported to the emergency room per hospital
policy. On July 15, 1991, however, she claimed that her shoulder
"hurt too much" and she didn't think about filling out an accident
report or going to the emergency room.
Instead, she left work
early at about 9:00 a.m. to see her treating physician, Dr. Curtis.
The applicant stated that she initially thought her shoulder pain
was caused by arthritis, but later after she discovered there were
torn ligaments, she decided the injury must have resulted from
lifting the trays at work.
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Penny Manchester, one of the applicant's co-workers, testified
that the applicant asked her to work for her on July 15, 1991. The
applicant appeared to be in a great deal of pain and was crying
when she asked Ms. Manchester to work for her. Ms. Manchester also
testified that Opal West was working on July 15, 1991.
Charles Featherstone, the applicant's husband of three years,
testified that before the alleged accident of July 15, 1991, the
applicant kept the house clean and always had supper ready when he
came home. After the accident, the house wasn't clean and supper
was "soup and sandwiches." Mr. Featherstone stated that his wife
seemed to be in more pain after July 15, 1991 than she was before
that date. He did not go with his wife to her June and July 1991
appointments with Dr. Curtis, so he did not know what the doctor
told her.
Marilyn Beesley, an insurance adjuster for the Utah Local
Government Trust, testified that she was the adjuster for the
applicant's April 16, 1991 lower back industrial claim.
She
received a request for approval of shoulder surgery to be charged
to the April 16, 1991 claim. Payment for the surgery was denied by
letter dated August 6, 1991 because there was nothing in her file
on the April 16, 1991 accident to support payment for the shoulder
surgery. The applicant called Ms. Beesley on August 7, 1991 to
request that she reconsider the denial of benefits. During this
conversation, the applicant did not mention a second accident in
July 1991. Ms. Beesley talked to the respondent in early August to
find out how the shoulder injury related to the accident in April
1991. The employer representative, Beth Bowles, indicated that she
did not know why the applicant had surgery. An employer's first
report of injury for the alleged July 15, 1991 accident was
received by the carrier on August 30, 1991.
Greg Coburn, the Director of Materials Management and Food
Services for the respondent testified that the applicant did not
tell him on July 15, 1991 that she had an industrial accident but
told him that her shoulder and arm hurt and she needed to leave.
The applicant had not mentioned her shoulder pain to him prior to
July 15, 1991. Mr. Coburn testified that Opal West was not working
on July 15, 1991. He stated that Opal regularly had Mondays off,
and that July 15, 1991 was a Monday. He also checked the work
schedule which showed that Opal was off that day and that Diane
Moore was the supervisor on July 15, 1991. Mr. Coburn saw the
applicant on August 29, 1991 when she came in to file an employer's
first report of injury. On cross examination, Mr. Coburn stated
that he did not fill out an incident report on July 15, 1991
because the applicant did not tell him the injury was industrially
related.
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Diane Moore, the applicants supervisor on July 15, 1991
testified that she wasn't at work when the alleged accident
occurred, but came to work at about 9:00 a.m. that day.
The
applicant came to her and told her that her shoulder and arm ached
and she needed to go to the doctor. Prior to the date of the
accident Ms. Moore and the applicant had discussed the applicant's
shoulder pain which was attributed to arthritis. Ms. Moore further
testified that she didn't fill out an incident report because the
applicant did not say that she had suffered an industrial accident.
On August 29, 1991, Gary Coburn called Ms. Moore and told her to
help the applicant fill out an incident report for the alleged July
15, 1991 industrial accident.
The ALJ determined that the applicant was not credible based
upon his observation of the witnesses and the inconsistencies
between the applicant's testimony and the evidence contained in the
medical records. The ALJ further found that Penny Manchester added
no factual support to the applicant's case and that the applicant's
husband was an antagonistic, biased and argumentative witness who
was neither credible nor reliable.
In Vali Convelescent
and Care Institutions
v. Div. of
Health
Care Financing,
797 P. 2d 438 (Utah App. 1990) , the Court of Appeals
cited with approval an Idaho case dealing with credibility
determinations by a hearing officer of an administrative agency.
The Idaho court noted
where credibility is crucial and where firsthand exposure to the witnesses may strongly
affect the outcome, we think the Personnel
Commission should not override the hearing
officer's impressions unless it makes a cogent
explanation of its reasons for doing so. Such
an explanation is essential to meaningful
judicial review . . .
Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Sandoval,
1987) cited in Vali at 449.

742 P. 2d 992, 996 (Ct. App.

We will only overturn an ALJ's findings of fact if there is a
compelling reason to do so, especially when the factual issues turn
on questions of witness credibility. In this case, we find no
compelling reason to overrule the ALJ's findings of fact. We
therefore conclude that the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions
of law are well supported by a preponderance of the evidence in the
record and hereby adopt them as our own.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
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For the reasons outlined above, we find that the applicant has
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she injured
her right shoulder in a compensable industrial accident on July 15,
1991.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED t h a t t h e Order o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
law j u d g e d a t e d November 3 0 , 1992 isp^hereby a^f formed.
DATED THIS N :?ft

1993.

""

DAY OF NOVEMBER,

S t e p h e n , M.

Ch^riiaii

Hadlefy ,

'

J

, v

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

\
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63-4Gb-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings
— Hearing procedure.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (ii), in all formal
adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions.
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer:
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly
repetitious;
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah;
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or
excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the
original document;
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially
noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other
proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts
within the agency's specialized knowledge.
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is
hearsay.
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit
rebuttal evidence.
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at
the hearing.
(0 All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be
considered in reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath.
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense.
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the
agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions that
the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect confidential information disclosed at the hearing.
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing.
History: C. 1953, G3-46l>-8, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 204; 1988, ch. 72, § 19.

Cross-References. — Judicial notice, Utah
It. Evid. 201.
Privileges, Utah It. Evid. 501 et seq.
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63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Orders.
In formal adjudicative proceedings:
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any
post-hearing papers permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time
required by any applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding
officer shall sign and issue an order t h a t includes:
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or
on facts officially noted;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law;
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision;
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration;
(0 a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the
order available to aggrieved parties; and
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review.
(2) The presiding officer may use his experience, technical competence,
and specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence.
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing
interim orders to:
(a) notify the parties of further hearings;
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the
issues presented; or
(c) otherwise provide for the lair and efficient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.
History: (\ 1953, OTMGb-10, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 101, * 206; 1988, ch. 72, $ 20.
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(J3-4Gb-12. Agency review — Procedure.
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior
agency, the aggrieved parly may Hie a written request for review within
30 days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity designated for that purpose by the statute or rule.
(b) The request shall:
(i) be signed by the party seeking review;
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested;
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each party.
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within
the time period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may
file a response with the person designated by statute or rule to receive the
response. One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties
and to the presiding officer.
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the
agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the
order within a reasonable time or within the time required by statute or the
agency's rules.
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule
permit the parties to file briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument.
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties.
(G) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other
filings, or oral argument, or within Ihe time requited by statute or applicable rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a written order on
review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a
person designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to
each parly.
(c) The older on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement ol* the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition:
(vi) whether the decision of the1 presiding officer or agency is to be
affirmed, leversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the
adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right oi further administrative reconsideration
or judicial leview available to aggrieved parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.
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63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(i) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of (he appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(h) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the recoul:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied bv the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agencv action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contiary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
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